@misc{noauthor_matching_nodate, title = {Matching in {Practice} – {European} network for research on matching practices in education and related markets}, url = {https://www.matching-in-practice.eu/}, language = {en-US}, urldate = {2021-03-07}, } @article{coles_preference_nodate, title = {Preference {Signaling} in {Matching} {Markets}}, language = {en}, author = {Coles, Peter and Kushnir, Alexey and Niederle, Muriel}, keywords = {\_C:Korea XKOR, \_C:Switzerland CHE, \_C:United States USA, \_\_C:filed:1, \_\_C:scheme:1, ❓ Multiple DOI}, pages = {38}, } @article{de_haan_performance_nodate, title = {The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2655067}, abstract = {On the basis of theory alone, it is hard to advise school districts which school assignment mechanism to adopt. While the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism has some desirable properties (strategy proofness and stability) that the Boston mechanism lacks, Boston may outperform DA in terms of welfare because it allows students to express the intensity of their preferences. We use a unique combination of administrative data and survey data to compare the two mechanisms empirically. We find that DA results in higher average welfare than Boston. This finding contradicts the baseline results from some recent studies that use structural approaches. This contradiction can be attributed to the structural models’ assumption that students do not make strategic mistakes. When we impose this assumption, the welfare ranking of the mechanisms reverses.}, language = {en}, author = {de Haan, Monique and Gautier, Pieter A and Oosterbeek, Hessel}, keywords = {\_C:Netherlands NLD, \_C:United States USA, \_\_C:filed:1, \_\_C:scheme:1}, pages = {35}, } @article{kominers_invitation_nodate, title = {An {Invitation} to {Market} {Design}}, abstract = {Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the infrastructure that enables those transactions to take place, market designers can address a broad range of market failures. In this paper, we illustrate the process and power of market design through three examples: the design of medical residency matching programs; a scrip system to allocate food donations to food banks; and the recent “Incentive Auction” that reallocated wireless spectrum from television broadcasters to telecoms. Our lead examples show how effective market design can encourage participation, reduce gaming, and aggregate information, in order to improve liquidity, efficiency, and equity in markets. We also discuss a number of fruitful applications of market design in other areas of economic and public policy.}, language = {en}, author = {Kominers, Scott Duke and Teytelboym, Alexander}, keywords = {\_C:Australia AUS, \_C:Brazil BRA, \_C:Chile CHL, \_C:Germany DEU, \_C:India IND, \_C:Indonesia IDN, \_C:Israel ISR, \_C:Japan JPN, \_C:Singapore SGP, \_C:Sweden SWE, \_C:Syrian Arab Republic SYR, \_C:United Kingdom GBR, \_C:United States USA, \_\_C:filed:1, \_\_C:scheme:1, ❓ Multiple DOI}, pages = {43}, } @article{kushnir_harmful_nodate, title = {Harmful {Signaling} in {Matching} {Markets}}, abstract = {Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms. We show that such mechanisms are harmful for some environments. While signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In particular, we consider a two-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same ”typical” known preferences with probability close to one or ”atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have known preferences over workers. We show that under some technical condition if at least three firms are responsive to some worker’s signal, the introduction of signaling strictly decreases the expected number of matches. JEL classification: C72, C78, D80, J44.}, language = {en}, author = {Kushnir, Alexey}, keywords = {\_C:Switzerland CHE, \_C:United States USA, \_\_C:filed:1, \_\_C:scheme:1, ❓ Multiple DOI}, pages = {18}, } @article{mennle_trade-os_nodate, title = {Trade-offs in {School} {Choice}: {Comparing} {Deferred} {Acceptance}, the {Classic} and the {Adaptive} {Boston} {Mechanism}}, abstract = {The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston mechanism where students automatically skip exhausted schools, which we call the adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM). Assuming truthful reporting, we compare student welfare under these mechanisms both from a conceptual and from a quantitative perspective: We first show that, BM rank dominates DA whenever they are comparable; and via limit arguments and simulations we show that ABM yields intermediate student welfare between BM and DA. Second, we perform computational experiments with preference data from the high school match in Mexico City. We find that student welfare (in terms of rank transitions) is highest under BM, intermediate under ABM, and lowest under DA. BM, ABM, and DA can thus be understood to form a hierarchy in terms of student welfare. In contrast, in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have found that the same mechanisms also form a hierarchy in terms of incentives for truthtelling that points in the opposite direction. A decision between them therefore involves an implicit trade-off between incentives and student welfare.}, language = {en}, author = {Mennle, Timo and Seuken, Sven}, keywords = {\_C:Belgium BEL, \_C:Estonia EST, \_C:Germany DEU, \_C:Mexico MEX, \_C:Spain ESP, \_C:Switzerland CHE, \_C:United States USA, \_\_C:filed:1, \_\_C:scheme:1, ⛔ No DOI found}, pages = {55}, } @article{schaefer_gis_nodate, title = {{GIS} in {Schools}: {Experiences} and {Progress} in {Germany}}, language = {en}, author = {Schaefer, Dirk}, keywords = {\_C:Germany DEU, \_\_C:filed:1, \_\_C:scheme:1, ⛔ No DOI found}, pages = {10}, }