TY - JOUR TI - The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence. AU - Combe, Julien AU - Tercieux, Olivier AU - Terrier, Camille AB - To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategyproof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism. DA - 2020/// PY - 2020 DP - Zotero SP - 88 LA - en UR - https://www.dropbox.com/s/92xsi3rg1jx1pzc/CTT.pdf?dl=0 KW - Lebanon_event_2021 KW - _C:Czech Republic CZE KW - _C:France FRA KW - _C:Germany DEU KW - _C:Ireland IRL KW - _C:Italy ITA KW - _C:Mexico MEX KW - _C:Peru PER KW - _C:Portugal PRT KW - _C:Spain ESP KW - _C:Turkey TUR KW - _C:United States USA KW - _C:Uruguay URY KW - __C:filed:1 KW - __C:scheme:1 KW - ⛔ No DOI found ER -